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Abstract
From cells to societies, several general principles arise again and again that facili-
tate cooperation and suppress conflict. In this study, I describe three general
principles of cooperation and how they operate across systems including human
sharing, cooperation in animal and insect societies and the massively large-scale
cooperation that occurs in our multicellular bodies. The first principle is that of
Walk Away: that cooperation is enhanced when individuals can leave uncoopera-
tive partners. The second principle is that resource sharing is often based on the
need of the recipient (i.e., need-based transfers) rather than on strict account-
keeping. And the last principle is that effective scaling up of cooperation requires
increasingly sophisticated and costly cheater suppression mechanisms. By com-
paring how these principles operate across systems, we can better understand the
constraints on cooperation. This can facilitate the discovery of novel ways to
enhance cooperation and suppress cheating in its many forms, from social
exploitation to cancer.
Introduction
In my work, I often think about humans and cells inter-
changeably – as networks of individuals sharing resources,
moving and responding to various challenges with adaptive
strategies. Both are capable of processing and responding
to complex information in the environment by changing
their behaviors and internal states. Both live in highly social
environments where their fitness is interdependent with
that of others. Sometimes, this interdependence is positive,
and we see cooperation, for example, when individuals
(whether cells or humans) rely on one another to survive
(Box 1). And sometimes, this interdependence is negative,
and we see conflict, like when individuals compete over
limited resources. In other words, social systems can be
both symphonies of cooperation and teeming masses of
conflict, sometimes, at the very same time. Whether a social
system ends up in a more cooperative or competitive state
is a result of both the opportunities available to the actors
and the decisions those actors make.
The main purpose of this paper is to provide an overview
of my work to date and provide some reflections on being
a female scientist. In the following pages, I provide a brief
overview of my work on the Walk Away strategy, need-
based transfers in sharing systems, and the problems inher-
ent in scaling up cooperation to systems including human
societies and multicellular bodies. I also provide some per-
sonal reflections on being a female scientist. Many of these
personal reflections appear in Box 2, but throughout I have
tried to provide some of the context in which my work was
done and the important intellectual influences on me and
on my work. I also identify what I think are some exciting
new areas of inquiry in cooperation theory, evolutionary
biology and cancer biology. Because the same fundamental
principles underlie cooperation and conflict across systems,
there are many unrealized opportunities that can be capi-
talized on by the next generation of interdisciplinary scien-
tists.
Even systems made up of seemingly identical entities
cooperating for a common goal, for example, cells in a
multicellular body require suppression of conflict. Cell-
level cheating is just suppressed strongly enough and long
enough for the multicellular body to survive and function
effectively until reproductive age (Brown and Aktipis
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2015). All large-scale cooperative systems, even those made
up of genetically very similar or identical entities, require
redundant layers of checks and balances to suppress the
conflict that would otherwise undermine the stability of the
system.
The simultaneous existence of cooperation and conflict
in large-scale systems can be understood in terms of fitness
interdependence: in domains where fitness is positively
interdependent, there are cooperative opportunities, and in
domains where fitness is negatively interdependent, there
are challenges that arise from conflict (Roberts 2005).
Cooperation and conflict can and often do exist simultane-
ously in any sufficiently large, complex, and long-lived
cooperative system, whether it is a multicellular body,
social insect colony, or human group (Strassmann and
Queller 2010).
The level at which selection is operating greatly influ-
ences the strategies that will evolve in these systems. Indi-
vidual selection favors strategies that prioritize individual
survival and reproduction, as is the case with cancerous
cells evolving in the body or organisms evolving in a highly
competitive environment. Higher levels of selection (in-
cluding what have been called group selection and multi-
level selection) favor strategies that enhance survival and
reproduction of the larger kin group, aggregation, or net-
work. Fitness interdependence of the individuals making
up these groups may help to predict the relative power of
selection operating at these different levels (Roberts 2005).
In most systems, selection operates simultaneously at
many different levels of organization. Take humans, for
example: selection simultaneously operates on the organ-
ism-level favoring cancer suppression mechanisms and at
the cell-level favoring neoplastic cells (Aktipis and Nesse
2013). It also operates on the level of genes and chromo-
somes, with genetic conflict being actively suppressed
within our genomes to prevent the spread of selfish ele-
ments (Hurst et al. 1996). Selection can also operate on the
level of kin groups or other aggregations, favoring more
cooperative partnerships and groups, as long as the struc-
ture of the population promotes sufficient positive assort-
ment (i.e., preferential interactions of cooperators with one
another). If positive assortment is high then individual-
level selection favoring exploiters do not undermine selec-
tion for cooperation at higher levels of organization (Eshel
and Cavalli-Sforza 1982; Pepper and Smuts 2002; Fletcher
and Doebeli 2009).
Selection at competing levels has shaped behavior and
physiology of many different systems. Selection among
individuals has led to effective competitive behavior, chea-
ter detection, and the ability to respond effectively to the
environment in many ways (including moving, changing
state, and altering the environment). Selection at higher
levels is important as well, whether we want to call it group
selection, multilevel selection, or social selection. These
higher levels of selection are what favored the evolution of
multicellularity and probably also what favored many
aspects of human sociality that we see as fundamental to
our humanity: our willingness to cooperate, our capacity to
entrain with one another, and our concern for the well-be-
ing of others, whether our genetic kin or others with whom
we have interdependent fates.
These examples make the questions of ‘what level of
selection is most important?’ seem somewhat misguided
(Kurzban and Aktipis 2007). Selection is operating on mul-
tiple scales simultaneously and it is the interaction between
these scales that shapes the cooperation and conflict that
we see at every level. My work spans many different scales
and systems so I am constantly reminded of the ways in
which selection for competition at one level can be sup-
pressed by selection for cooperation at a higher level. In the
case of cancer suppression, this works partially through
organism-level suppression of evolution itself: tissue archi-
tecture and the constraints on cell proliferation (including
having only a subset of stem-like cells capable of proliferat-
ing) are in place largely to prevent somatic evolution that
could lead to cancer (Cairns 1975). In humans many differ-
ent cheater suppression mechanisms contribute to our
capacity to cooperate effectively, some of which are exter-
nal such as our genetic similarity to others or our embed-
dedness in social systems with institutions and norms.
Others may be internally regulated, like or feelings of com-
mitment or conscience. And yet other cheater suppression
systems may be cocreated with our social groups, making
them potentially unique and diverse across cultures (and
subject to cultural evolution). Evolution can operate on all
of these cheater suppression systems at multiple levels of
organization, from small groups to large social organiza-
tions.
Overview of scientific contributions
As a freshman at Reed College, I took Mel Rutherford’s
Evolutionary Psychology course, getting my first academic
introduction to evolution and behavior. Dr. Rutherford
was a visiting professor who had studied with Cosmides
and Tooby (two of the leading figures in the field of evolu-
tionary psychology) at the University of California, Santa
Barbara. Through this course, I read Axelrod’s seminal
work on the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod 1984) and
came to realize that computational approaches had the
power to answer many important questions about coopera-
tion in humans and in other systems. I was so intrigued by
the prospect of addressing these questions computationally
that I decided to teach myself how to program, first in C++
and Java, and then agent-based modeling platforms that
easily enabled the inclusion of space and individual deci-
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sion-making rules. I was particularly drawn to the question
of whether the ability of individuals to leave interactions
with defectors could stabilize the evolution of cooperation.
Earlier work on mobility and the evolution of cooperation
showed that movement provided an advantage for defec-
tors (Dugatkin 1992; Dugatkin and Wilson 1992; Ferriere
and Michod 1995, 1996). I was curious whether conditional
movement (as opposed to random movement) could pro-
vide an advantage for cooperators by allowing them to
preferentially interact with one another and avoid contin-
ued interactions with defectors.
Know when to Walk Away
Individuals of many types Walk Away from bad situations:
humans leave bad relationships, foraging animals leave
exploited patches, and cancer cells leave hypoxic (low oxy-
gen) environments. It is easy to see how such a rule would
evolve: individuals who leave bad environments have
higher fitness than those who stay. But what happens when
groups of individuals use this rule to respond to their social
environments is something quite astounding: the coopera-
tive option comes to have higher fitness than defection
and that enables cooperation to take over a population of
defectors.
The Walk Away strategy (and conditional movement
more generally) is fundamentally very simple. In fact, Walk
Away is a social generalization of a foraging rule that states
‘stay if things are good, otherwise leave’. It breaks the frame
of the traditional prisoner’s dilemma game (Fig. 1) in that
individuals have the ability to leave if they are not satisfied
with the payoffs from being a part of their current partner-
ship or group. This fits with many real world situations
that humans, cells and other organisms experience where
they have the ability to leave an interaction or environment
that is not favorable (with, of course, some important
exceptions which I will address later). The basic features of
the Walk Away strategy and its implications for coopera-
tion in various systems are illustrated in Fig. 2.
When I went to graduate school to work with Rob Kurz-
ban at the University of Pennsylvania (U Penn), I contin-
ued working on models of Walk Away and other
cooperation topics. It was in graduate school that I had the
chance to fully develop these models and begin turning
them into successful publications with the advice and men-
toring of my advisor, Dr. Robert Kurzban.
The two-player Walk Away model is based on the
prisoner’s dilemma payoffs (Fig. 1), in which two
agents each decide whether to cooperate or defect in a
given round of play. Walk Away agents (i.e., agents
that have the ability to leave after a partner defects)
Cooperate
C
o
o
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Defect
D
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ec
t
3, 3
0, 05, –1
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Figure 1 Payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Row player is in
bold.
Walk away
Cooperation high enough?
HumansCells
Conditional movement away from poor social environments
Examples
Leads to smaller, less stable 
groups and more loners
Leads to larger, 
more stable groups
Cells leave depleted environment 
(e.g., low oxygen)
Humans leave depleted environment 
(e.g., overgrazed)
Positive 
assortment selects 
for cooperation in 
population
Yes No
Stay Leave
Positive 
assortment maintains 
cooperation in 
population
Figure 2 The top panel shows the basic Walk Away rule, with individu-
als conditionally leaving uncooperative groups. When individuals use
such a Walk Away strategy, this increases the stability of cooperative
partnerships and groups, increasing positive assortment (i.e., the likeli-
hood that cooperators will interact with one another relative to defec-
tors). If cooperation is initially low, positive assortment leads to
selection for cooperation (right side loop); if cooperation is initially high,
positive assortment helps to maintain it (left side loop). The bottom pan-
els give two examples of Walk Away in the natural world: cells leaving
low oxygen (hypoxic) regions and humans leaving depleted environ-
ments.
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play against traditional tit-for-tat players that copy the
previous partner’s behavior and several other strategies.
In these models, cooperative Walk Away agents outper-
formed all other strategies that were included in the
simulation (Aktipis 2004). This means that a strategy
of All-Cooperate is viable as long as cooperators have
the ability to ‘Walk Away’, that is, leave defecting part-
ners. Cooperators do not need to have the ability to
avoid defectors, only the ability to respond to the fact
that they interacted with a defector by moving to
another location in space. This is different from
Enquist and Leimar (1993) proposition that cooperation
in mobile organisms requires antifree riding adaptations
beyond mobility itself. The results of the Walk Away
model are similar in some ways to Enquist and Leimar
(1993) results: both models found that defectors only
outperformed cooperators when search costs for new
partners were low. However, Enquist and Leimar con-
cluded that mobility restricts cooperation, while the
Walk Away model demonstrates that conditional move-
ment can create the conditions that select for coopera-
tion. These different conclusions are likely a result of
both differences in the modeling approach (agent-based
versus analytical) and different rules for ending pair-
wise interactions. In the Walk Away model, partners
stayed together until one partner left or the pair was
disrupted, while in Enquist and Leimar’s model pairs
stayed together until one partner left or when the max-
imum coalition time was reached (Enquist and Leimar
1993).
In my work, I have also implemented the Walk Away
strategy in a group-wise context, where agents have the
opportunity to invest in a public good, and the results of
that investment are distributed evenly to all group mem-
bers regardless of who invested (Aktipis 2011). This is anal-
ogous to a situation like a work team where individuals
might vary in their contributions, but every team member
gets equal credit for the outcome. In the model, individuals
are either cooperators who invest in the public good or
defectors who do not. Every individual has a threshold for
the level of cooperation required to stay in their current
group, else they leave and move around randomly until
they encounter a new group. This leads to cooperative
groups being more stable and uncooperative groups being
less so (Fig. 2), which leads cooperative individuals to have
more opportunities to interact and receive cooperative pay-
offs. The group structure emerges from agents staying,
leaving, and the successful agents reproducing. Groups are
not predefined as they typically are in public goods models.
In the Walk Away model, the structure and dynamics of
the population change over time, initially being dominated
by migrating defectors (Fig. 3A) and later stable coopera-
tive groups (Fig. 3B). Walk Away cooperators outper-
formed defectors over most of the parameter space
investigated. This was the case as long as Walk Away agents
were somewhat intolerant of defectors, not staying in
Figure 3 Screenshots from the group-wise Walk Away model (Aktipis 2011). (A) At the beginning of the model (t = 200), defectors (red) dominate
the population. (B) Later, (t = 40 000) cooperators (blue) are more common, and groups are larger, more productive (as indicated by green patches)
and more stable.
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groups composed of more than half defectors. Even when
some defection was tolerated, cooperators were able to
preferentially assort as a result of this very simple move-
ment rule and that assortment allowed cooperation to
evolve and be stable.
Walk Away favors cooperation because it promotes posi-
tive assortment, the preferential interactions of cooperators
with one another. Positive assortment has been proposed
as the fundamental principle underlying the evolution of
cooperation across systems (Fletcher and Doebeli 2009).
When cooperative individuals are able to preferentially
provide benefits to other cooperators and limit interactions
with defectors, cooperation becomes much more evolu-
tionarily viable. This basic principle drives the evolution of
cooperation via kin selection, group selection, reciprocity
and virtually every explanation of cooperation that has
been given in the cooperation theory literature to date
(Fletcher and Doebeli 2009). This means that the Walk
Away rule can promote the evolution of cooperation in
many different contexts, including both interactions among
kin and nonkin.
The effectiveness of conditional movement strategies in
promoting the evolution of cooperation via assortment has
been shown in a number of other models. These include
Pepper’s environmental feedback models, which simulate
strategies based on simple foraging rules and show that the
cooperative trait of restrained eating behavior can evolve
(Pepper and Smuts 2002; Pepper 2007) and a nonspatial
conditional movement model in which individuals are
automatically re-paired with a new partner after leaving
(Schuessler 1989). A model published soon after the origi-
nal Walk Away article demonstrated that conditional
movement away from defectors can evolve when agents
have a broad potential behavioral repertoire (Hamilton
and Taborsky 2005), and a more recent study showed that
conditional mobility is more effective than conditional
cooperation (Izquierdo et al. 2010). Empirical work also
shows that conditional movement enhances assortment
and may therefore play a central role in the evolution of
prosocial behavior. For example, in water striders, female
‘Walk Away’ behavior appears to limit the success of
aggressive males, leading selection to favor less aggressive
males that would otherwise be the case (Eldakar et al.
2010). Studies in the laboratory with humans have also
found ‘Walk Away’ behavior when individuals have the
option to exit the interaction after an encounter with a
defector (Orbell et al. 1984).
The Walk Away rule and conditional movement more
generally belong to the class of partner-choice rules. These
rules can favor cooperation by creating implicit or explicit
competition for being a good partner in biological or social
‘markets’ (Noe and Hammerstein 1994; Barclay 2013).
Partner choice can favor the evolution of cooperation
through social selection, a process parallel to sexual selec-
tion in which costly traits may be favored if they increase
the likelihood of being chosen as a social partner by other
cooperators (West-Eberhard 1979; Nesse 2009). In partner-
choice models, individuals have the ability to determine
who they will and will not interact with based on informa-
tion they have gathered from past behavior or interactions.
This enables cooperators to preferentially interact with each
other, which promotes behavioral assortment and favors
cooperation (Fletcher and Doebeli 2009).
Walk Away is an extremely simple partner-choice rule as
it requires no memory, reputation, or other complex infor-
mation-processing capabilities. This is in contrast to some
complex models of conditionally moving agents that came
before Walk Away (e.g., Vanberg and Congleton 1992; Yam-
agishi et al. 1994). Walk Away simply responds to the cur-
rent payoffs it receives, leaving partners or groups that are
insufficiently cooperative. This rule is effective despite its
simplicity because it limits the costs to cooperators of inter-
acting with noncooperators and it changes the dynamic
structure of the population in ways that favor cooperation
(Figs 2 and 3). This simplicity is one of the strengths of
Walk Away as a model for the evolution of cooperation
across forms of life including those without nervous sys-
tems. However, this simplicity is also a limitation when it
comes to understanding more complex forms of coopera-
tion, including those that characterize human social living.
In our lives and careers and relationships, we do not
always have the ability to decide when to stay and when to
leave. Some of these constraints on the ability to Walk
Away are a result of our own previous actions. For exam-
ple, if we have invested a lot in a shared goal or endeavor,
we might experience of feeling of ‘sunk costs,’ not wanting
to give up on something that we have already invested so
much in. We might also commit emotionally to a person
or group, inhibiting our Walk Away behavior. Other inhi-
bition of Walking Away could be because of fear of the
consequences of leaving, either because there are no good
outside options or because of the threat of punishment.
Many of these constraints are instantiated by norms,
institutions, and culture. Some of them probably help to
enhance cooperation and prevent exploitation, but others
may be in place to enable some individuals to exploit
others. We participate in many long-term and investment-
intensive activities that require long-term associations,
commitment, and sometimes even signaling that we have
cut off outside options. We also have the ability to bond
with each other, which constrains our willingness to leave if
things are not good. Many signals of commitment are basi-
cally ways of saying ‘I will never Walk Away’. My work on
the Walk Away strategy has so far been limited to modeling
Walk Away in dyads playing the prisoner’s dilemma (where
it outperforms both tit for tat and defection) (Aktipis
© 2015 The Author. Evolutionary Applications published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd 9 (2016) 17–36 21
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2004) and in public goods games (where cooperators dom-
inate the population) (Aktipis 2011). But extending this to
specific questions about human relationships requires tak-
ing a broader perspective.
Humans probably have a Walk Away-like rule, but it
almost certainly operates on a longer time scale than just
considering the payoffs of the most recent interaction. Also,
the question of how leaving thresholds are set (i.e., how
much will you tolerate being exploited before leaving?) is
an important open question. Previous experience might
influence the leaving threshold and the time frame over
which previous payoffs are integrated when considering
whether or not to leave. In humans, our willingness to
Walk Away is probably often heavily influenced by our
emotional engagement and bonds with one another.
I would offer that Walk Away, or the ability to leave a
bad social situation, is in some ways the ‘ancestral’ state,
with other emotional capacities such as bonding building
upon it and modifying it in various ways to allow us to
benefit more from long-term associations and signal our
cooperative intentions. Future work could extend the Walk
Away model to investigate the specific questions about
human relationships, including how bonding and attach-
ment may inhibit Walk Away behavior and alter selection
on the evolution of cooperative and defecting strategies. In
human relationships (and likely in other systems), informa-
tion over multiple time periods and from multiple sources
is likely to be included in the decision to Walk Away or stay
including the assessment of the value of outside options
and the costs associated with leaving. Future Walk Away
models may help us answer questions about human social-
ity by incorporating these factors.
Taking an evolutionary approach to cancer
My postdoctoral advisor, John Pepper, was the first person
who introduced me to evolution and cancer. I came to the
University of Arizona (U of A) to work with him on mod-
els of organismal mobility and cooperation since he had
worked extensively on that topic (Pepper and Smuts 2001,
2002; Pepper 2007), but we soon realized that the evolution
of motility was likely to be occurring in cancer, with poten-
tially important implications for cancer progression. We
decided to develop a model of dispersal evolution in neo-
plasms to test whether cells that exploited resources evolved
to be more mobile. Our model showed that high cell meta-
bolism leads to the evolution of higher cell motility (Ak-
tipis et al. 2012). More generally, our model and other
models suggest that dispersal evolution may play an impor-
tant role in invasion and metastasis in cancer (Chen et al.
2011; Aktipis et al. 2012).
Walk Away dynamics may also help to illuminate other
aspects of cancer biology that are poorly understood. For
example, Walk Away processes such as cells leaving hypoxic
conditions or poorly maintained microenvironments could
contribute to the dynamics of invasion and metastasis
(Schiffman et al. in press). Cells are able to engage in Walk
Away behavior through upregulating motility factors when
in poor environments (Pennacchietti et al. 2003) (Fig. 2).
This means that early microenvironmental destruction
could contribute to initial invasion in cancer.
During the time I spent at U of A as a postdoc, I also had
the privilege of spending time in the laboratory of Rick
Michod, who has worked extensively on the evolution of
multicellularity from a cooperation theory perspective
(e.g., Michod 1999; Michod and Roze 2001). I learned a
great deal from the time that I spent in that laboratory,
especially interacting with Aurora Nedulcu (who was visit-
ing from the University of New Brunswick at the time). As
a result of all of these interactions in Dr. Pepper’s and Dr.
Michod’s laboratory, I realized that there were many
important connections between cooperation, multicellular-
ity, and cancer.
I also realized that the Walk Away model could be
extended to explore questions about the evolution of multi-
cellularity: the first multicellular entities may simply have
been dividing cells that ‘decided’ not to Walk Away from
each other despite resource competition, perhaps because
there were public goods being produced that made staying
have a higher payoff than leaving. Later, other regulatory sys-
tems are likely to have evolved that modified this Walk Away
behavior to make multicellularity more viable. These are
open questions that arise from the Walk Away framework
and could have important implications for our understand-
ing of the evolution of both multicellularity and human
sociality.
Giving to those in need
Resource sharing is feature of cooperation across many dif-
ferent kinds of systems at a variety of scales. From hunter–
gatherers engaging in what anthropologists call ‘central
place food sharing’ to multicellular bodies transporting
resources to cells that need them, cooperative systems
are characterized by what my colleagues and I have ter-
med ‘need-based transfers.1’ Need-based transfers are
exactly what they sound like: resource transfers that are
conditional on the need of the recipient (and usually also
the ability to give).
1My work on need-based transfers is in collaboration with Lee Cronk, an
Anthropologist at Rutgers University. We first began using the term ‘need-
based transfers’ after Daniel Hruschka suggested that it was the appropriate
term to describe the algorithm we were studying in human sharing
systems.
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There are many other systems in which need-based trans-
fers occur, both human and nonhuman (Fig. 4). According
to the ethnographic literature, and our preliminary field-
work at several of our sites, many small-scale societies
around the world engage in resource sharing based on the
need of the recipient (L. Cronk and C. A. Aktipis, unpub-
lished data). Many nonhuman species use need-based trans-
fers to cope with risky environments and uncertain resource
availability. Vampire bats famously studied for their appar-
ently reciprocal food sharing were also engaging in need-
based transfers, with bats in dire need being the most likely
to receive blood from donors (Wilkinson 1984). Ants and
other social insects engage in a food-sharing behavior called
trophallaxis. An ant coming back from successful foraging
will return to the nest searching for nest mates with whom
to share. Recipients may simply tap the donor’s body lightly
on the antenna or forelegs, inducing the donor to orient
toward the recipient and regurgitate a droplet of food (H€oll-
dobler and Wilson 2009). These behaviors of bats and ants
are parallel to what we often see in human need-based trans-
fer systems: an individual in need makes a request and the
donor gives when he/she has a resource surplus. Similar
need-based rules also operate among cells making up multi-
cellular bodies and are likely to have been central to the evo-
lution of large multicellular forms of life (Knoll 2011).
The need-based transfer framework for cooperation is a
formalization of two simple resource transfer rules (1) ask
only if in need and (2) give if you are asked and able
(Fig. 4). Like reciprocity, it can involve a special relation-
ship between two parties, but unlike strict account-keeping
style reciprocity, it does not involve tracking of debt and
credit. The evolutionary logic for need-based transfers can
be understood through extension of Hamilton’s rule
(Hamilton 1964a,b), where relative need affects the costs
and benefits of resource transfers among parties, and the
relatedness term is generalized to include all forms of fit-
ness interdependence (Box 1). If the relative need of the
recipient is high, then resource transfers can be viable even
with very low levels of relatedness or other forms of fitness
interdependence. If one individual in a pair is very much in
need and the other individual has more than they need to
survive, then the cost, c, to the wealthy individual of giving
to the needy individual is very low and the benefit, b, to the
needy individual is very high. The importance of relative
need in the evolution of cooperation has long been recog-
nized in the context of reciprocity (Boyd 1992). The need-
based transfer framework highlights the importance of rela-
tive need in the viability of cooperation and calls attention
to the fact that c and b can vary in behavioral time given
different condition of the individuals and the threats and
opportunities present in their environments.
The need-based transfer framework also has important
connections to signaling theory as requests associated with
need are typically signals sent from one individual to
another. John Maynard Smith described the Sir Phillip Sid-
ney Game (Smith and Harper 2003), which is essentially a
Resource sharing based on the need of recipient
Request
Response
Outcome
ExamplesHow it works
Cells
Humans
Vampire bats
Social insects
Limited risk pooling between 
partners, better survival
Request is granted, as long as 
there are enough resources.
Nutrient transfer in multicellularity
Trophallaxis - food transfer from 
full to hungry ants
Blood shared most with hungry bats
Livestock and food sharing systems
Request to fill a need is made.
1
2
3
Need-based transfers
Request size (X) = 
threshold – current resources
Can I please 
have X?
Threshold
Request granted if X ≤ Y
Y = resources 
above threshold
Yes, I have 
enough to give 
you X.
Figure 4 This figure illustrates the basic components of need-based
transfer systems and some examples. The left panel shows basic steps
in need-based transfers: first a request is made, then a response is made
in the form of a resource transfer (assuming certain conditions are met,
which can lead to positive outcomes in the form of greater risk pooling
and higher survival. The right panel provides four examples of need-
based transfers in biology: cells sharing resources, ants transferring food
through trophallaxis, vampire bats sharing blood meals, and humans
sharing food or livestock.
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need-based transfer game. Its name is drawn from the pur-
portedly true story of Sir Phillip Sidney who was fatally
wounded on the battlefield and gave his water to another
solider saying ‘thy necessity is greater than mine’. In the Sir
Phillip Sidney Game, there are two individuals, a signaler
who can be in one of two states, either in need or healthy,
and a responder who can either give (at some cost) or not
give. Both players are then assumed to act to maximize
their inclusive fitness. This models shows that signaling of
need can evolve among relatives (Smith and Harper 2003),
suggesting that need-based transfers may have initially
evolved in the context of parental investment. Subsequent
work suggests that the conditions favoring honest signaling
and giving may be more restrictive than initially thought
(Bergstrom and Lachmann 1997, 1998). Future work
explicitly linking need-based transfers and the evolution of
signaling of need may help to answer open questions about
the information conditions under which signals of need
and need-based resource transfers can evolve.
I first became interested in need-based transfers in the
context of the Maasai gift giving systems known as ‘oso-
tua,’ which I learned about from Lee Cronk. Before begin-
ning my postdoctoral work at U of A, I had contacted Dr.
Cronk about doing a postdoctoral fellowship with him.
He had no positions available, but wrote me back with an
idea for an agent-based model. He described the osotua
systems of the Maasai, where individuals form special rela-
tionships with one another that they can call upon in
times of need. Dr. Cronk wanted to develop an agent-
based model together to test whether this system provided
benefits for the individuals using it. I was intrigued by
deceptively simple osotua rules: ask only if in need, give if
you are asked and able. I wanted to know whether such a
simple rule could enhance survival, and so Dr. Cronk and
I began what has grown into a decade-long collaboration
examining need-based transfers, first in the context of the
osotua system and then expanding to many other societies
and systems.
The osotua system is akin to the kinds of relationships
that many of us have with old friends that we know we can
depend on, even if we have not seen them for years. In the
Maasai system, this often takes the form of requests for cat-
tle and other livestock after an unexpected event such as
drought, disease, or theft.
Cheating in need-based transfer systems is different from
cheating in account-keeping reciprocity systems (where
rules typically boil down to not taking benefits without
incurring costs). In need-based transfer systems, the rules
are simple: ask only when in need and give if asked and
able. Cheating in this system is then parallel to that: asking
when not in need and not giving if asked and able. This
means that very little information is needed to determine
whether somebody has cheated in a need-based transfer
system. One only needs to know the size of the request and
the resource holdings of the giver and receiver. You might
now be wondering how a system like this avoids a situation
where one individual repeatedly asks another for resources
and never gets paid back. Interestingly, it does not. If one
individual is wealthier and luckier than the other round
after round or year after year, resources may flow largely
one way in the direction of need. This is very different from
Box 1: Hamilton’s rule and need-based transfers
The need-based transfer framework can be understood in the
context of Hamilton’s rule by integrating relative need and a
broader conception of fitness interdependence (rather than
just genetic relatedness). Considering Hamilton’s rule (Hamil-
ton 1964a,b), one can see that the conditions favoring resource
transfers become less restrictive as relative need of the involved
parties gets larger. The original formulation of Hamilton’s rule
can be written as follows:
r[
c
b
where b is the benefit to the receiver, c is the cost to the giver
and r is the relatedness between the parties. It is not necessary
to know the absolute values of c and b to know the viability of
the resource transfer act in Hamilton’s rule. To translate
Hamilton’s rule to a need-based transfer context, we can
simply replace c/b with a term for relative need of the giver to
the receiver:
r[
1
d
where d is the relative need of the receiver compared to the
giver. As relative need, d, increases, the conditions under
which resource transfers are viable become more permissive.
Even very low levels of relatedness favor resource transfers if
the receiver is in much greater need than the giver. If we
replace r with a term that denotes the fitness interdependence,
shared fate or the stake individuals have in one another
(Roberts 2005), s:
s[
1
d
We can see that high relative need can favor resource trans-
fers even if fitness interdependence, s, is low and that high fit-
ness interdependence can favor giving even if there is little
difference in the need of the recipient and giver. Interestingly,
if individuals have a greater stake in another than in them-
selves (which may sometimes be the case for postreproductive
individuals), then s > 1, and givers can be favored to give even
if they are more needy than the recipient. This approach also
can also represent negative fitness interdependence that can
occur in competitive context (s < 0) including even spiteful
scenarios (b/c > 1/s and b and s are negative) (Roberts 2005).
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the rules of engagement in account-keeping reciprocity sys-
tems.
This is not to say that need-based transfer systems are
characterized by exploitation. Among the Maasai, there are
‘3Rs’ that come along with osotua: restraint, respect, and
responsibility. Maasai herders are expected to be restrained
in their use of resources, respectful of others (especially
those on whom them depend) and responsible in the care
of their herd. These 3Rs help to solve the moral hazard
problem that can result when individuals do not carry all
the risk associated with their behavior by requiring that
everyone will behave in ways that reduce the likelihood of a
negative event.
The initial model and the paper that came out of our
early work together (Aktipis et al. 2011) began as an inter-
esting side project for us both. During the early years of
our collaboration, I finished my PhD and began a postdoc,
and Dr. Cronk was working on a book about cooperation
and coordination (Cronk and Leech 2013). Nevertheless,
we met about once a month, often on the weekends, and
the project slowly grew and grew. Our original need-based
transfer model showed that the osotua system helps Maasai
herders to pool the risk associated with living in an uncer-
tain environment (Aktipis et al. 2011). Since then we have
extended and expanded this model to examine need-based
transfers in networks of individuals. We found that larger
more connected networks provide greater risk pooling,
although with decreasing marginal returns after networks
are sufficiently large and well connected (Hao et al. 2015).
We also discovered that need-based transfer rules can
outperform account-keeping and that the payoffs for each
of these strategies correspond to a stag hunt or coordina-
tion game. This means that both parties do better if they
use the same strategy rather than each using different
strategies. It also means that either strategy can be stable
and that there is no incentive to switch from one strategy
to another unless the parties can coordinate to both switch
to the higher payoff coordination point (which happens to
be the need-based transfer strategy) (C. A. Aktipis,
R. DeAguiar and L. Cronk, unpublished data). We have
also found that need-based transfer systems lead to less
wealth inequality than is the case with no transfers (Hao et
al. 2014) or with account-keeping rules (C. A. Aktipis, R.
DeAguiar and L. Cronk, unpublished data).
Our work also suggests that the osotua system, and
need-based transfer more generally, can effectively scale up
to larger networks (Hao et al. 2015). However, many
important questions remain about the viability and com-
parative performance of need-based transfer systems
relative to account-keeping in the presence of cheaters. We
are now investigating the question of cheating in need-
based transfers through both computational modeling and
‘cheater detection’ experiments with human subjects. Early
results of these studies suggest that humans may have spe-
cialized reasoning systems for detecting cheating in need-
based transfer rules (Chang et al. 2015).
Our work on need-based transfers has now grown into a
much larger and more interesting project than we could
have anticipated. We now have a multidisciplinary research
project, The Human Generosity Project (www.humangen-
erosity.org), which is funded largely by the John Templeton
Foundation and the National Science Foundation. This
support has allowed us to assemble a large team to examine
need-based transfers across societies. Our methods include
fieldwork at seven field sites around the world, human sub-
jects experiments, computational modeling, educational
initiatives in collaboration with the Exploratorium science
museum in San Francisco, and outreach efforts with policy-
makers to examine the viability of need-based transfers for
solving modern resource management challenges.
In addition, my laboratory is now exploring the implica-
tions of need-based transfers for multicellularity and can-
cer. Cells in our multicellular bodies are constantly
redistributing resources, a process necessary for keeping
our bodies alive and healthy. Need-based transfers are likely
to have played a central role in the evolution of multicellu-
larity given the necessity of transporting resources for the
growth of multicellular aggregations beyond a few millime-
ters in diameter (Knoll 2011). As aggregations of cells
became larger, they required transport systems to move
resources from the cells on the outside to those on the
inside that could not get sufficient oxygen and nutrients
from diffusion (Beaumont 2009). In fact, models show that
resource sharing can make larger aggregations of cells more
fit than smaller ones (Pfeiffer and Bonhoeffer 2003), sug-
gesting that need-based transfers could have contributed to
the viability and competitiveness of larger aggregations
over smaller ones.
Need-based transfers among cells form the backbone of
resource transport in multicellular bodies. This is the case
in simple multicellularity where junctions between cells
allow resources to flow to cells in regions with lower
resources, and it is also the case with more complex forms
of multicellularity that have bulk transport systems such as
our circulatory system (Knoll 2011). Our circulatory sys-
tems’ primary function is to transport resources to periph-
eral tissues. It is also able to dynamically respond to the
signaling of cells in low resource conditions that release sig-
nals (called angiogenic signals) that lead to the growth of
new blood vessels to bring resources to cells signaling need,
a process that is often exploited by cancer cells (Hirota and
Semenza 2006). If cancer cells upregulate angiogenic signal-
ing and/or increase their rate of resource use, this can
contribute to cancer (Aktipis et al. 2012). Further, the abil-
ity to take up more resources can lead to deterioration of
the shared environment and select for cell dispersal and
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metastatic capacity (Aktipis et al. 2012; Schiffman et al. in
press). Thus, it appears that the framework of need-based
transfers and cheating may have important implications for
our understanding of cancer progression.
All in all, the need-based transfer framework has been a
productive tool that has led to many models and novel
hypotheses. Through The Human Generosity Project, our
team is using results from our models in conjunctions with
fieldwork and human subject experiments to better under-
stand the decision-making rules underlying need-based
transfers, how they manifest across societies, and the way
that they scale up to larger networks of interacting individ-
uals in many diverse systems.
Challenges in cheater suppression
When cooperation shifts from small-scale interactions to
massively large-scale cooperation of the kind that we see in
human societies, eusocial insects and multicellular bodies,
new challenges and opportunities arise (Fig. 5). Larger
scale social interactions offer many opportunities: individu-
als can insulate themselves from risk through resource
sharing and achieve greater overall productivity through
division of labor and even benefit from what economists
call ‘economies of scale’— the ability to get higher marginal
returns with larger scale operations (up to a certain point).
Scaling up also presents with a number of new challenges
including resource distribution challenges and the creation
and management of a shared environment (e.g., removing
waste), and the necessity of regulating reproduction and in
some cases death (e.g., in the case of apoptosis in cells).
If individuals do not solve these problems effectively,
then large aggregations of individuals become unstable and
evolutionarily inviable. For example, a deteriorating shared
environment can lead individuals to leave (i.e., Walk
Away). We see this among cancer cells with the upregula-
tion of movement factors in hypoxic conditions (Pennac-
chietti et al. 2003) and in foraging and dispersal behavior
in many species (Stephens and Krebs 1986; Dieckmann
1999). Another example of a failure to solve the problem of
cheating effectively is in the regulation of proliferation. In
aggregations in which there is an optimal group size based
on resource constraints, a failure to properly regulate pro-
liferation (and/or death) can lead to overgrowth, threaten-
ing the viability of the whole aggregation.
The challenges and opportunities associated with scaling
up cooperation can clearly be seen in the evolution of mul-
ticellularity and cancer. Multicellularity requires evolving
the capacities for cooperation and suppressing cheating in
what we have termed the five foundations of multicellular-
ity: proliferation inhibition, control of cell death, resource
allocation, division of labor, and extracellular environment
maintenance (Aktipis et al. 2015). We found that a break-
down of each of these forms of cooperation was associated
with cancer and cancer-like phenomena across species
(Fig. 6). We also found that cheating in these foundations
corresponded to the hallmarks of cancer (Hanahan and
Weinberg 2000, 2011).
In the case of multicellular bodies and eusocial insects,
selection has not only favored large-scale cooperation and
cheater suppression, but it has also resulted in the ability to
reproduce at the aggregate level. Multicellular organisms
produce offspring that undergo a multicellular develop-
ment program as they grow, and eusocial insect colonies
create new colonies that go through a kind of superorgan-
ism developmental program and grow to full-size colonies.
The ability to reproduce as an organism or superorganism
is often considered an important component of what
defines an organism or individual (Michod 1999; Strass-
mann and Queller 2010).
To reach this new level of individuality, the component
cells or organisms must effectively suppress cheating
and commit to cooperation (Michod and Roze 2001;
Strassmann and Queller 2010). How does this commitment
happen? In the case of multicellular bodies, the developmen-
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Figure 5 Scaling up cooperation from small-scale social interactions to
large-scale societies presents similar opportunities and challenges across
systems, from the evolution of multicellularity to human groups. Larger
cooperative groups present opportunities for enhanced public good
production, economies of scale, risk management, and division of labor.
However, larger groups also have greater challenges when it comes to
detecting and suppression cheaters.
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tal program for the whole organism commits some cells to
be dead-end somatic cells and others to be germ-line cells
that propagate the genes of the multicellular organism into
the next generation. However, somatic cheating often
emerges despite these controls and so multicellular bodies
like ours have backup systems: inappropriately proliferating
cells are targeted for immune destruction (although cells that
can evade the immune system can sometimes continue pro-
liferating, which can lead to cancer). Social insect colonies
have similar systems; with different castes have different gene
expression states that commit them to nonreproductive
functions. But they too often have backup policing systems
where any eggs laid not by the queen are detected and
destroyed. Interestingly, committing to reproducing as a
unit limits the ability of cells to ‘Walk Away.’ Perhaps these
complex and multilayered cheater suppression systems are
necessary to make cooperation viable in these systems
because Walking Away (and its decentralized assortment-en-
hancing effects) cannot operate to enforce and favor cooper-
ators when there is commitment to reproduction as an
organism or superorganism.
Human societies do not exhibit the same transition in
individuality that we see in multicellularity or eusocial
insect colonies, but we do see very large-scale cooperat-
ion and policing of cheaters in human societies. Are the
challenges and opportunities in scaling up human coopera-
tion similar to these other systems? We certainly have some
of the same opportunities to benefit from cooperation
including the ability to pool risk through sharing, divide
labor and capitalize on economies of scale. We also
encounter some of the same challenges in creating and
maintaining a high quality shared environment (take, for
example, the tragedy of the commons) and keeping our
resource use and reproductive rate within the limits of our
carrying capacity. This is true for both local resource avail-
ability in small-scale societies and for global capacity in
large-scale global society.
Thus, we can ask whether humans solve these problems
through cheater suppression and committing to coopera-
tion in ways that parallel multicellular bodies and eusocial
insect colonies. There are a few lines of work in human
evolution and behavior that are relevant to this question.
The ability to detect cheating has been argued to be a cen-
tral component of human social cognition (Cosmides and
Tooby 1992, 2005) and across societies, individuals are
often willing to incur costs to punish cheaters (Henrich
et al. 2006). Interestingly, it has also been argued that one
of the factors that allowed humans to scale up to larger
societies was the internal regulation of behavior based on
supernatural beliefs (Johnson 2005; Marlowe 2009; Henrich
et al. 2010; Schloss and Murray 2011). This has interesting
parallels to the capacities of cells in multicellular bodies to
regulate their resource use, proliferation rate, and other
potential sources of cheating through internal regulatory
systems.
In smaller scale human interactions, commitment is one
tool that can facilitate cooperation (Frank 1988; Nesse
2001). This commitment can be emotionally instantiated in
the case of bonding and attachment to family members,
mates, or friends that facilitates sharing resources and
working toward shared goals. Commitment can also take
the form of cultural and institutional systems that con-
strain behavior and outside options in ways that can
enhance cooperation. Sometimes, these types of internal
and external commitment overlap in interesting ways. For
example, pair bonding is an internal emotional commit-
ment that enhances affiliative behavior, and marriage can
serve as an external commitment device that creates costs
of leaving and lowers the risk associated with cooperation
and investment in shared goals (e.g., raising offspring). The
osotua system used by the Maasai is an another example of
a hybrid commitment system that appears to involve both
emotional engagement with the osotua partner (i.e., gen-
uine concern for their wellbeing) and a cultural framework
that makes violations of the osotua system inconceivable
(Cronk 2007).
Interestingly, the 3Rs of osotua (respect, restraint
and responsibility) correspond in many ways to the
‘expectations’ that multicellular bodies have for the
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This figure is reprinted from Cancer Across the Tree of Life (Aktipis et al.
2015).
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behavior of cells: restrained reproduction and resource
use, respect for signals from neighboring cells and the
environment, and responsibility to perform required tasks
and maintain the shared environment. When cells fail to
follow these 3Rs, their neighbors may stop sending sur-
vival signals (necessary to prevent cell death). If that fails,
they are often targeted for destruction by the immune
system.
Open questions and reflections
Should we expand our definition of kinship?
In evolutionary biology, we tend to define kinship as
genetic relatedness, but this definition is much narrower
than definitions used in other disciplines. In the discipline
of history, kinship is considered a much broader term
encompassing close relationships in which there was some
form of inheritance and/or restriction on marriage (Sabean
et al. 2007). In anthropology, ‘fictive kinship,’ or the use of
kin terms with individuals not closely related is understood
to play an important role in cooperation and the establish-
ment of relationships (Cronk and Gerkey 2009). Religious
organizations, both historical and modern, use ‘spiritual
kinship’ (often in the form of godparent/child relation-
ships) as a way to establish close relationships that often
involve gifts and resource transfers. Given the role of these
other notions of kinships in human history and modern
life, why do we usually define kinship so narrowly in evolu-
tionary biology?
Hamilton’s rule, the foundation of inclusive fitness the-
ory, takes r, the coefficient of relatedness (see Box 1). But
this same rule can use any form of positive assortment as r.
This rule holds whether r refers to genetic relatedness by
descent, genetic relatedness not through descent or even
just behavioral assortment of cooperators (including indi-
viduals of different species) (Fletcher and Doebeli 2009).
Any positive fitness interdependence of individuals with
one another can provide the material upon which selection
for cooperation can act according to Hamilton’s rule. So
when individuals are dependent on one another through
some form of shared fate, this can be functionally identical
to a genetic kinship in terms of the strength of selection on
cooperation (see Box 1).
This fitness interdependence approach is similar to
Roberts’ ‘stakeholder model,’ where individuals have a
stake in the wellbeing of others for reasons including but
not limited to genetic relatedness (Roberts 2005). This
stakeholder model is a way to represent a variety of forms
of fitness interdependence including those that arise from
genetic relatedness, from repeated interactions (e.g.,
reciprocity) and even other forms of interdependence such
as shared fate. This approach also can encompass scenarios
in which individuals have greater stake in another than
themselves (which may sometimes be the case for postre-
productive individuals) or the negative fitness interdepen-
dence that can occur in competitive context including even
spiteful scenarios (Roberts 2005).
The stake individuals have in one another’s wellbeing
is often dependent on the context (e.g., one environment
may reward competition, and another, cooperation). In
large and complex groups, cooperative and competitive
options often exist simultaneously and individuals also
often have the ability to decide between taking a cooper-
ative and competitive approach, which will influence
whether the stake is positive or negative. Making the
decision to choose a cooperative option can be made
more viable through certain mechanisms. For example,
the decision to enter into a commitment that binds fates
together will increase the stake that individuals have in
one another. In systems, such as multicellular bodies, the
stakes of cell are bound together through the costly com-
mitment to give up independent modes of reproduction
and reproduce only through the germ line. In complex
human societies, collective costly signaling of having high
stake in the wellbeing of partners or group members
could lead to a ratcheting to very higher levels.
Can humans detect fitness interdependence?
This raises the question of whether humans have the capac-
ity to detect situations in which we are highly fitness inter-
dependent with others, that is, when we are in the same
figurative boat, and conditionally cooperate in those situa-
tions. Common knowledge regarding positive fitness inter-
dependence should make cooperation even more likely. If
both individuals know that they need to rely on one
another to survive and succeed, it makes cooperation a less
risky choice for both. How might such common knowledge
be established between individuals who have positive fit-
ness interdependence? One possibility, of course, is the use
of kinship terminology. However, this use of language can
be exploited by individuals looking to take advantage
(Qirko 2011). Thus, the use of kin terminology can be
‘cheap talk,’ that is, not a costly enough (or reliable
enough) signal to make it worth taking a risk of coopera-
tion if the stakes are high.
How might individuals signal common knowledge
about fitness interdependence in a more reliable way?
Costly signals such as rituals and public commitments
may be more reliable methods for mutually signaling posi-
tive fitness interdependence. Many scholars have proposed
that religion and endorsement of sacred values may pro-
vide ways for individuals to signal commitment and coop-
erative intentions (Irons 2001; Sosis and Alcorta 2003;
Henrich 2009; Atran and Henrich 2010; Bulbulia 2012;
Soler 2012).
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More private signals such as mutual entrainment might
also serve to create common knowledge about cooperative
intentions. Social entrainment involves the reception and
processing of rhythmic signals, followed by the generation
of rhythmic signals based on the input, which is then
processed by the social other (Phillips-Silver et al. 2010).
This capacity for entrainment is what enables us to coor-
dinate rhythmically to produce collective vocalizations,
music, and dance. This kind of intense attention and allo-
cation of mental bandwidth to interaction may serve as a
reliable signal of willingness to coordinate toward meeting
shared goals. Engaging in coordinated vocalization, music,
and dance production might be more likely among indi-
viduals who perceive positive fitness interdependence or
are motivated to establish common knowledge to that
effect.
These examples raise the broader question of whether we
have the capacity to detect genuine commitment (i.e.,
cooperative intent) and then behaviorally assort on the
basis of it (Aktipis 2000). Social selection (where individu-
als choose who to have fitness relevant interactions with)
could favor both mechanisms for signaling of commitment
and mechanisms to accurately detect genuine commitment.
This may have led to a signaling arms race on the parts of
both signalers and receivers contributing to the complexity
of social signals, with the production and detection of
vocalizations such as genuine laughter (Bryant 2012; Bryant
and Aktipis 2014) and the collective production of music
(Hagen and Bryant 2003) and dance (Phillips-Silver et al.
2010). As a dance instructor during college and graduate
school, I was always struck by how powerful a tool dance
was for establishing trust and bonds among new acquain-
tances. I suspect that this may generalize to other domains
of rhythmic coordination. Some literature suggests that the
act of singing together in karaoke has become an important
component of building relationship trust among Taiwanese
businessmen (Holt and Chang 2009), suggesting that
entrainment may function as a fairly reliable cue of cooper-
ative intent in some modern contexts. Laughter may also
be a powerful signal of cooperative intent: the very act of
laughing makes us physically weak, making it a genuine
and costly way to signal that one is not a threat (Bryant
and Aktipis 2014).
What other proximate cues might humans use to assess
positive fitness interdependence, or ‘extended kinship’?
We know from the incest avoidance literature that living
in the same home with someone as a child is a proximate
cue to kinship, as is witnessing nursing occurring from
the focal individual’s mother (Lieberman et al. 2007). But
there are other cues that might have been reliably associ-
ated with genetic relatedness that could potentially be co-
opted for assessing positive fitness interdependence more
generally.
The act of eating together, especially from a ‘shared
table’ could be a candidate. Eating together is a central
important part of what makes people feel like family. Even
within families, eating together fosters feelings of closeness
and intimacy. With friends and acquaintances, eating
together at a shared table from a common pot makes us
all feel more comfortable and trusting. Regularly consum-
ing and sharing food together without aggression or com-
petition over these resources may contribute to our
feelings of affiliation and ‘extended kinship’ with others
because it is a reliable signal of cooperative intent and
having a stake in each other’s well-being. Eating together
with an attitude of gratitude seems particularly effective at
eliciting positive feelings, at least in our home. The cen-
trality of eating together in human social life and coopera-
tion is an anecdotal fact, but it has also been documented
by social psychologists (Argyle 2013) and is implicit in
much of the anthropological literature on food sharing
(Winterhalder 1986). Whether the act of eating together
enhances trust and cooperation is an open question,
but the fact that negotiation guides advise that sharing
meals is an important contributor to successful outcomes
(Graham and Lam 2003; Bernard 2009) is certainly
suggestive. Preliminary work at our Malpai field site in
southern Arizona and New Mexico suggests that eating
meals together is an important part of the need-based
transfer systems.
Parental investment at the intersection of cooperation and
conflict
Parental investment is likely to be the original need-based
transfer, and the language of ‘osotua’ is consistent with this
notion: the literal translation is umbilical cord, metaphori-
cally referring to the unidirectional transfer of resources
from mother to child. Amy Boddy, who is at the moment a
postdoc in my laboratory, has started a research project
looking at maternal–fetal interactions themselves from a
need-based transfer perspective. Mothers transfer resources
to their offspring based largely on offspring need during
gestation (Sibley et al. 2010) and lactation (Daly and Hart-
mann 1995). However, despite high levels of parental
investment in humans, there is still conflict between the
mother and offspring over the exact allocation of resources
(Haig 1993). Maternal and fetal systems are therefore likely
to have cheater detection mechanisms of some type for
detecting violations of need-based transfer rules in resource
allocation. Dr. Boddy, myself and our other collaborators
often draw on our own experiences as investing parents to
guide our broader thinking and develop specific predic-
tions about mother–offspring need-based transfers.
Women, especially mothers, can bring a unique and
valuable perspective to the topic of mother–offspring
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cooperation and conflict, a research topic that has been largely
dominated by the sex that is a bystander to the process.
Maternal–offspring conflict illustrates how high levels of
conflict often exist among kin. It also calls our attention to
the fact that cheater detection systems may be just as neces-
sary for interactions among genetic kin as they are in inter-
actions among unrelated individuals. If need-based
transfers among kin required cheater detection mecha-
nisms (e.g., for offspring who ask when not in need or par-
ents who do not give when able) and effective responses
(e.g., punishing or recalibrating behavior in other ways),
then these same kin-based cheater detection systems could
also have been co-opted for detecting cheating in interac-
tions among nonrelatives.
Interestingly, on the other extreme, kin recognition is
not necessary for effective parental investment in certain
ecological conditions. My models have shown that high
rates of correctly directed parental investment can occur
when mobility and sociality are low and parental invest-
ment occurs over a short period of time (Aktipis and Fer-
nandez-Duque 2011). On the other hand in species with
high mobility, high sociality, and extended periods of
investment, it is necessary to have mechanisms for identify-
ing kin to ensure selective resource transfer only to off-
spring or other relatives.
Over evolutionary time, kin detection mechanisms such
as these may have become more generalized to identify a
larger class of individuals: those with whom we have shared
fates or other forms of interdependent fitness. The results
of this model (Aktipis and Fernandez-Duque 2011) there-
fore predict that the emergence and generalization of kin
detection (to situations in which there is positive fitness
interdependence) should be more likely to evolve in species
that already have high levels of parental investment, high
mobility, and high sociality, for example, in humans.
How can we use cooperation theory to understand cancer
and improve treatment?
Recently, my colleagues and I published a review of cancer
across life. We noted how cancer cells ‘cheat’ in the five
foundations of multicellular cooperation: proliferation
inhibition, controlled cell death, division of labor, resource
allocation, and extracellular environment maintenance
(Aktipis et al. 2015). We also offered that in advanced
stages of cancer there may be a re-activation or re-evolu-
tion of foundations of multicellular cooperation, in the ser-
vice of the colony of cancer cells rather than the
multicellular body.
Selection for these colony-level cooperative phenotypes
may even be enhanced by Walk Away dynamics, with cells
leaving uncooperative clusters and staying in more cooper-
ative ones. There might therefore be selection among
colonies favoring cancer cells that produce public goods
(e.g., growth factors, angiogenic signals) or otherwise
enhance the microenvironment quality from the perspec-
tive of the cancer cells (Schiffman et al. in press).
Selection at the colony level could also lead to reproduc-
tive division of labor, with only some cells maintaining the
capacity to proliferate indefinitely and other cells con-
straining proliferation and instead contributing to the fit-
ness of the indefinitely proliferating cell from which they
are derived. My colleagues and I have shown that this ‘pro-
tomulticellularity hypothesis’ is one potential explanation
for the existence of so-called nonstem cells in neoplasms
(Sprouffske et al. 2012) and it is in many ways analogous
to the collective phenotypes of many social insect colonies.
Cancer is a fascinating subject to study as a cooperation
theorist, and it is also an area where evolutionary biology
and cooperation theory have much to contribute. My col-
leagues and I are now applying the foundations of multicel-
lular cooperation framework for cancer to develop assays
of cooperation and cheating that could be used in the clinic
to guide treatment and risk stratification (Aktipis et al.
2015). We are also applying life-history theory at both the
cellular (Aktipis et al. 2013) and organismal (Boddy et al.
2015) levels to understand cancer susceptibility and
develop treatment algorithms that take into account the
evolutionary dynamics of neoplasms. We have shown that
reproductive competition can reduce the viability of cancer
suppression (Boddy et al. 2015; Brown and Aktipis 2015)
and that inclusive fitness effects can select for cancer sup-
pression in old age in species with high levels of parental
care, grandparental care, and cooperative breeding systems
(Brown and Aktipis 2015).
Cooperation and evolutionary approaches not only have
a lot to teach us about cancer, but cancer also has a great
deal to teach us about the evolution of multicellularity and
cooperation. Multicellular bodies are amazing examples of
massively large-scale cooperation. They are possible
because conflict among the component parts has been sup-
pressed at many different levels including the cell level and
the level of selfish genetic elements. One of the ways in
which multicellular bodies suppress this competition is
through actually suppressing and slowing the process of
somatic evolution itself. DNA repair lowers the mutation
rate, and having only a subset of cells indefinitely prolifer-
ate lowers the effective population size, thus slowing the
rate of evolution. Also, many aspects of tissue architecture
serve to suppress the evolutionary process that might
otherwise select among cells and eventually lead to neoplas-
tic growth and cancer (Cairns 1975).
The high levels of cooperation we see in multicellular
bodies are not a sign of the absence of conflict, but rather
the effective suppression of conflict and cheating. Any suf-
ficiently large and long-lived cooperative system must sup-
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press conflict that inevitably arises from the myriad close
associations of its component parts. This suggests that can-
cer suppression may have some important things to teach
us about human social life and how to solve some of the
challenges associated with successfully expanding coopera-
tion to large-scale systems.
Can we leverage cooperation theory for institutional
design?
Humans develop many large-scale systems that require
complex cooperation and monitoring of potential cheating.
Cooperation theory can offer some potential solutions to
the problems that arise in large-scale systems. Here, I dis-
cuss two possible applications: using positive assortment
principles in the peer review process and applying need-
based transfers to the problem of insuring in the face of
radical uncertainty.
Positive assortment for peer review
We know from both theoretical and empirical work that
cooperation is enhanced when cooperators can preferen-
tially interact with one another. Several years ago, my col-
league Sharon Thompson-Schill and I proposed that this
first principle of positive assortment could be applied to
the peer review process (Aktipis and Thompson-Schill
2010). We suggested that reviewers could be given a score
based on speed of reviewing, rate of reviewing, or other pri-
orities of the journal editor. Authors would then be paired
with reviewers who have similar scores. This could increase
the speed of reviewing and decrease the burden on review-
ers at no financial cost. This solution to the problem of the
‘tragedy of the commons’ of peer review (Hochberg et al.
2009) has not been taken up yet by any journals (to our
knowledge), but in our conversations with journal editors,
many have been intrigued.
Need-based transfers for decentralized insurance
On a much larger scale, the principle of need-based trans-
fers could potentially be leveraged in institutional design in
ways can provide solutions some of the problems that arise
from our living in an increasingly uncertain world. Sharing
in times of need is an ancient human solution for manag-
ing the risk associated with living in a volatile environment
(Winterhalder 1986). In modern life, we now often choose
to invest in insurance to protect us from potential shocks.
However, not all negative events can be insured against
because some are so rare that they cannot be assigned a
probability. This kind of uncertainty, sometimes called rad-
ical uncertainty or Knightian uncertainty (Knight 1921),
poses a problem for insurance systems because it cannot be
quantified using standard actuarial approaches. Need-based
transfer relationships, like the osotua relationships among
the Maasai, do not require a quantification of all risks to
function as an effective decentralized insurance system so
they might offer solutions to the problems associated with
radical uncertainty.
In need-based transfer systems, individuals help each
other in times of need, up to their ability to help without
putting themselves at risk. This functions as a system of
limited risk pooling that can provide risk mitigation for the
entire network without making the whole network vulnera-
ble. Need-based transfer relationships may be able to insure
against radical uncertainty in some cases because they do
not require exact assessment of the probabilities of negative
events. When individuals recognize their reliance on one
another and their interdependence (i.e., when s is high, see
Box 1), their willingness to make commitments to mutual
aid may increase. Our global society is becoming increas-
ingly interdependent, and we are all living in a more and
more uncertain world. This suggests that need-based trans-
fer systems can perhaps be leveraged to expand our capac-
ity to deal with risk and uncertainty as our world changes
more and more rapidly. As part of The Human Generosity
Project, we are working with the Decision Center for a
Desert City at ASU and the Extension Disaster Recovery
Education Network at Cornell to translate need-based
transfers to modern resource management and disaster
recovery challenges through workshops and discussions
with policymakers.
Conclusions
As humans, we seem compelled both to understand human
nature and to discuss our views about human nature with
one another. This debate about whether human nature is
essentially cooperative or competitive goes back to early
philosophical writings and has divided people for centuries.
Is it much of a surprise then, that it divides much of the
cooperation theory community today? Yes and no. ‘No,’
because this questions of whether altruism really exists cuts
to the core of our beliefs about human nature and is there-
fore deeply important to scientists, philosophers, and every
person trying to navigate complex human social life. And
‘yes’, it is surprising that it continues to be debated so vehe-
mently because we now have mathematical and computa-
tional models that now tell us that cooperation and
competition can and do coexist in most systems. These
models allow us to investigate the fundamental dynamics
that shape cooperation and conflict, and answer questions
about the nature of social life that we have never before
been able to examine with such power. Why, then, do we
continue to debate these topics, even with the tools to
answer many of these questions?
This may be largely a psychological and sociological
question, related to issues like our in-group/out-group
© 2015 The Author. Evolutionary Applications published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd 9 (2016) 17–36 31
Aktipis Cooperation across systems
Box 2: Personal reflections
My interest in evolution and behavior started when I was in high school. At my local bookstore I found popular books about psychol-
ogy, evolution and the intersection of the two. My parents bought me book after book, many of which I read while traveling to Greece
and Austria (their natal homes) during the summers between my high school years. I have many wonderful memories of reading and
taking notes while being in amazing places with my parents, like the summer when my mother did charity work in a monastery in
Corfu, perched above the cliffs looking over the island and the sea. Despite my father being a ‘traditional Greek’ in many ways, he
encouraged my intellectual interests and career ambitions from an early age.
I arrived at Reed College at the age of 17, eager to learn as much as I could about evolution and behavior. Despite being a freshman,
Mel Rutherford allowed me to take her upper-level evolutionary psychology course my first semester and very generously supervised
me in for an independent study course in evolution and behavior during the second semester. The summer after, I got an internship
at the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona (U of A), where I had a wonderful (albeit hot) summer learning
about experimental economics methodology. Unbeknownst to me my advisors there arranged for me to be accepted into the graduate
program at U of A. Ultimately I chose to finish my undergraduate studies at Reed before beginning graduate school, a decision I do
not regret. While at Reed, I had many truly wonderful professors who inspired me both in terms of my interest in the subject matter
and their passion for teaching and creating a vibrant intellectual environment.
The first work I did on the Walk Away strategy was while I was still an undergraduate. At first, I thought of modeling as just a
hobby: something fun to do just to explore interesting ideas. I remember sitting in a bar in Berlin with some friends – Nicole Hess
who was then a graduate student and Ed Hagen who was at the time a Postdoctoral Fellow (they are now both at the University of
Washington) – and telling them about my result that Walk Away could outperform tit for tat in the agent-based model I had written.
They told me that the results were interesting and that I should write it up for publication. I followed their advice and the paper that
resulted (Aktipis 2004) is now my most highly cited paper.
During graduate school at the University of Pennsylvania (U Penn), I continued my work on the Walk Away strategy as well as
developing several other lines of research with my graduate advisor, Robert Kurzban. I was lucky to be in a laboratory that was open-
minded to modeling approaches and to be in a graduate program that allowed me to continue this work, despite the fact that it was not
the kind of work that was traditional for a psychology department. During this time I also had two children and faced the challenges of
balancing my coursework, dissertation research and the care of two young children. I was very lucky to have a mentor who was a suc-
cessful (and tenured) female professor who herself had several children in graduate school. She helped me to navigate the complex
social and political landscape that I unintentionally created when I arrived in class, at colloquiums and lab meetings with my infant.
After completing my PhD at U Penn, I accepted a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Arizona (U of A) in the Department of
Ecology and Evolutionary Biology to work with John Pepper. At the time I still had two very young children and a husband with a job
in Philadelphia. This was an important transition time in my life for many reasons. I had to make perhaps the most important ‘Walk
Away’ decision of my life in terms of my marriage, and I also ended up changing the subject matter of much of my work dramatically
(although using very similar methods and principles). During the two years that I commuted back and forth from Philadelphia and
Tucson, I had time to reflect on my life from 30 000 feet and I made many decisions and changes. I ended up leaving my marriage and
changing the focus of my research from the evolution of cooperation to the intersection of cooperation theory and cancer evolution.
My postdoctoral advisor, John Pepper, was not just the first person to introduce me to evolutionary approaches to cancer but he
was also the person who introduced me to Carlo Maley, an evolutionary cancer biologist who eventually became my husband. We
have perhaps the most academic love story imaginable: we fell in love while writing a grant bringing together our two fields: cancer
evolution and cooperation theory. We got the grant, got married and moved to San Francisco together to start the Center for Evolu-
tion and Cancer at the University of California San Francisco (USCF). Soon after, we had a child together, for a total of three. I was
lucky to have a very equal partner in parenting and excellent childcare.
From that point forward, I had to navigate the complexities of managing my own career as a young female scientist while working
on a number of projects with my husband (who was senior to me and partly in the same field). Although it was rarely explicit, I some-
times encountered situations in which work that I had done collaboratively with him was treated as if it ‘did not count’ toward my
record, even for projects that I had initiated and led. This is a challenge that other female scientists I know have encountered as well.
We nevertheless continued to collaborate, working on papers and planning conferences on evolution and cancer during the years that
we were at UCSF.
Carlo and I recently had the privilege of spending a year at the Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin (the Wissenschaftskolleg or
Wiko as it is affectionately called) as part of a cancer evolution working group convened by Michael Hochberg. We had the opportu-
nity to work together with many brilliant and fascinating scientists to identify major open questions in evolution and cancer and col-
laborate on several papers. One of the main outcomes of our discussions was to bring together cooperation theory with cancer
evolution through considering the ways that cancer cheats multicellular cooperation. Being a part of this working group (and interact-
ing with other working groups, especially the extreme traits working group) challenged my thinking and brought my cooperation the-
ory work and Carlo Maley’s work on cancer suppression across life together in ways that it might otherwise have taken decades. Wiko
was also extremely family friendly, helping us arrange schools, babysitters, and even providing free babysitting every Thursday for the
fellows’ dinner. It is experiences like that year at Wiko that make being an ‘academic couple’ worth all the complexities that it brings.
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psychology, how we conceptualize kinship, and even our
folk psychology of parenting. In our own social lives, we
often focus on either the aligned interests or the conflict-
ing interests we have with one another, rather than
acknowledging the complexities. This might indeed be
adaptive for many situations: It can serve to organize
goals and behavior and might also signal our intent to
other parties in ways that improve outcomes. However,
our evolved psychology of cooperation and conflict might
sometimes be a barrier to understanding the nuances of
complex social situations in which goals exist at multiple
levels of organization and even within a single relation-
ship, where high levels of conflict and cooperation might
coexist.
This is perhaps nowhere more clear than in familial rela-
tionships. Large family events are often characterized by
conflict as much as they are by cooperation, an anecdotal
fact that has received surprisingly little attention from aca-
demics interested in family relationships. But our experi-
ence tells us that conflict exists among genetic kin, just as it
does among nonrelatives, and models of kin conflict tell us
that sometimes resource competition is even more likely
among genetic kin than nonrelatives because of limited dis-
persal (West et al. 2002). This means that even among
genetic kin it is necessary to suppress conflict and cheating
to create large-scale and long-lived aggregations. The
potential for cooperation, too, exists among individuals of
all types, whether genetic kin, nonrelatives or even individ-
uals of another species. Perhaps expanding our definition
of kinship in the biological sciences or simply using the
broader term of ‘positive fitness interdependence’ could
help us to see past our intuition that genetic relatives are a
privileged class of individuals when it comes to the benefits
of cooperating.
Many of my experiences in life and science have led me
to the same conclusion: Conflict and cooperation are not
two opposites, but can and often do coexist. In fact, they
often go hand-in-hand when individuals are in close associ-
ation with one another. Whether we are considering two
siblings, a married couple, or academics working closely
together on a project, we see the same general principle:
More interaction means more opportunities for both con-
flict and cooperation. Or in the language of evolutionary
cooperation theory, close associations foster both positive
and negative fitness interdependence.
How, then, can we effectively navigate relationships
characterized by both opportunities for cooperation and
the challenges associated with conflict? Perhaps the
advice to eat, laugh, and dance together is not just a trite
nicety, but instead an idea well worth testing in the labo-
ratory and in our own lives. I would offer from my own
experience and cultural background (which is equal parts
Greek Islander and Viennese culture lover), that food,
music, dance, and other types of shared exuberance form
much of the fabric of trust and positive mutual engage-
ment within families and beyond. Whether it is with
genetic kin, close friends who feel like family, or new
acquaintances who you are just getting to know, sharing
a meal and a good laugh may go a long way toward
helping navigate the complexities of human social living.
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